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The Sources of Cost Diﬀerence in
Health Insurance Plans
AD ecomposition Analysis
Matthew Eichner, Mark McClellan, and David A. Wise
Almost two-thirds of Americans under age sixty-ﬁve are covered by em-
ployer insurance plans. Like Medicare costs, employer medical costs have
also risen quickly in recent years, and in many respects, even more dra-
matic reforms in have occurred in ﬁrm health insurance plans than in the
Medicare program. Yet research on the consequences of these reforms,
including many types of managed care reforms, has been limited. Unlike
with Medicare, the provisions of employer plans vary a great deal from
ﬁrm to ﬁrm, and so do the costs of medical care, suggesting that diﬀer-
encesi nplan provisions may have a substantial eﬀecto nh e alth care ex-
penditures. Thus analysis of employer plans provides a unique opportunity
to understand the relationship between plan provisions and expenditures
forh e alth care.
Them echanisms that might be eﬀective in controlling cost, however, will
depend importantly on the source of cost diﬀerences. For example, if cost
diﬀerences are accounted for in large part by a small number of plan en-
rollees who are treated for speciﬁc high-cost illnesses, eﬀorts to control
cost must necessarily focus on the treatment of these illness. If cost diﬀer-
ences are due to the use of diﬀerent procedures for treating seriously ill
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241patients, then it is important to know what the procedures are. In contrast,
if cost diﬀerences result from more modest diﬀerences in the expenditures
incurred by a large number of enrollees, then eﬀective cost control mecha-
nisms would have to be directed toward the medical utilization of more-
typical enrollees, perhaps those who use only outpatient services.
In this paper we focus not on the incentive eﬀects of plan provisions—
whether demand-side price incentive or supply-side managed care limits
on care—but on the sources of cost diﬀerences across plans. Our hope is
that understanding the reasons for cost diﬀerences across plans will direct
more focused attention to analysis of the ways that costs can be controlled.
Indeed, this work is intended as an important ﬁrst step in that direction.
We aree ngaged in a long-term project to analyze the determinants of
cost diﬀerences across ﬁrms. In particular, we look forward to estimation
that can be used to predict the eﬀect on medical expenditures of speciﬁc
changes in medical insurance plan provisions. The project is based on in-
surance claims records from a large number of employers. The vast amount
of information in insurance claims records is both a blessing and a curse.
Ak ey advantageo fclaims data is the detail they provide. The detail also
poses a challenge, however: how best to summarize and convey the infor-
mation contained in the millions of claims ﬁled each year under a typical
employer-provided plan.
Our goal in this paper is top r esent a method that allows us conveniently
to summarize information contained in the claims data. In particular, we
want to describe the sources of cost diﬀerences across plans. We consider
eight plans that vary in average expenditure for those ﬁling claims, from a
low expenditure of $1,645 to a high of $2,484. We then propose a method
to decompose these diﬀerences into their component parts. The goal is to
quantify the contribution of each of component to total cost variation
across ﬁrms. We believe that this method allows us to point directly to the
sources of cost diﬀerence and thus will help us to focus subsequent anal-
ysis where it is most likely to make a diﬀerence. Thus this general analysis
of cost variation across plans will provide the basis for further studies of
the incentive eﬀects of plan provisions on costs.
Identifying the eﬀecto fplan provisions on health care costs is compli-
cated for several reasons. Diﬀerences in plan costs may arise from many
sources other than plan incentive eﬀects, including geographic location
and the demographic attributes of plan members. Much more diﬃcult to
account for are unobserved diﬀerences in the types of individuals selecting
health plans: Individuals who expect to use more health care, who are
more risk averse, or who have greater “taste” for health care are more
likely to choose more generous coverage when an employer oﬀersam e n u
of plans. This is the issue to which Eichner (1997) has devoted a great deal
of attention, and it is the issue to which we will return once the sources of
cost diﬀerences are better understood.
242 Matthew Eichner, Mark McClellan, and David A. WiseWe believe that ours is the ﬁrst eﬀorta tadetailed decomposition of the
sources of cost diﬀerences across health plans. We consider both the rate
of treatment and the treatment cost, given treatment, for thirty diagnostic
groups. We ﬁrst consider how much of the rate and the cost for each treat-
ment can be attributed to the demographic mix of plan members. The total
demographic eﬀect is decomposed into the eﬀect of demographic mix on
the rate of diagnoses, and the eﬀect ont r e a tment cost given diagnosis.
Then the cost diﬀerences that remain, after the demographic adjustment,
ared ecomposed further into rate and treatment eﬀects.
Previous descriptive studies have documented cost diﬀerences associ-
ated with ﬁrm location and employee demographic characteristics, based
largely on aggregate cost diﬀerences. Yet it is unknown whether cost varia-
tion across plans is due to more intensive treatment of a few of high-cost
enrollees or to marginally more intensive treatment for the majority of
plan enrollees. We believe that understanding where the intensity, and
hence cost, of treatment diﬀers will be a basis for further analysis of the
eﬀects of plan provisions on costs.
Detailed descriptive analyses may also provide evidence on how cost
diﬀerences due to selection eﬀects arise within plans. Understanding both
the incentives of plan provisions and the eﬀects of self-selection into plans
may be enhanced by detailed analyses of what kinds of patients and medi-
cal treatments contribute to cost diﬀerences. For example, a larger propor-
tion of patients with heart disease or other chronic illness in one of two or
more plans from which employees may choose may well reﬂect selection
eﬀects. On the other hand, higher costs due to more “elastic” conditions
such as mental illness or back pain may well reﬂect plan provision (incen-
tive) eﬀects. Similarly, higher costs due to more intensive treatment given
the occurrence of an illness may well represent plan incentive eﬀects be-
cause these aﬀectp atients, providers, or both. Describing the sources of
cost diﬀerences at this level of detail not only provides some evidence on
whether cost diﬀerences are due to selection or incentives, but also pro-
vides a detailed foundation for more explicit causal studies of how plan
provisions aﬀecte xpenditures. For example, studies of changes in inci-
dence or intensity of particular health problems resulting from reforms in
health plan structure are likely to provide detailed insights into how partic-
ular plan provisions aﬀect expenditures.
We address many, but not all, of these questions by analyzing cost
diﬀerences in insurance plans oﬀered by eight ﬁrms. We ﬁrst describe the
claims data that are used for the analysis and present summary informa-
tion on medical expenditures in the selected ﬁrms. We then describe the
decomposition method that is used to determine the sources of cost
diﬀerencesa mong these eight ﬁrms. Calculations based on this method are
then presented, primarily using graphical representations. The last section
is a summary and discussion.
Sources of Cost Diﬀerence in Health Insurance Plans 2438.1 The Data and Summary Description
8.1.1 The Data
The analysis is based on a unique data set obtained from MedStat. The
data provide comprehensive information on medical utilization for enroll-
ees in a variety of employer-provided health insurance regimes. The data
include all inpatient and outpatient health insurance claims ﬁled by em-
ployees and their dependents in forty-ﬁve ﬁrms that self-insure (i.e., these
ﬁrms may pay an insurance carrier to process claims, but not to assume
risk). All risk is borne by the employer, who essentially pays the annual
medical bills of its employees and their dependents. The ﬁrms include a
variety of industries, health care costs, plan provisions, and workforce
characteristics.
Thed atac ontenti sstandardized by MedStat, providing essentially iden-
tical data for each ﬁrm. Each claim includes a patient identiﬁer, a provider
identiﬁer, the date of the medical service, the claim amount, the copayment
and deductible amounts paid by the patient, the place of service—hospi-
tal, physician oﬃce,i n termediate care facility, etc.—and International
Classiﬁcation of Disease, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) and Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT) codes identifying the principal diagnoses and proce-
dures performed. The patient’s age, sex, and relationship to the employee,
and employment status—hourly or salaried, active or retired—are also re-
ported.
Thep r imary goal of this paper is to illustrate the decomposition proce-
dure. The analysis is based on expenditures in eight plans in seven large
ﬁrms. These ﬁrms were selected for this initial study in part because they
oﬀer only one plan to each employee (one of the ﬁrms has two plans, but
each plan serves a diﬀerent employee group). To simplify interpretation of
the results, we wish to conﬁne the analysis here to diﬀerences across plans
that can be attributed not to self-selection of plans by employees who are
oﬀered a menu of plans from which to choose, which is typical of most
ﬁrm insurance regimes, but to the incentive eﬀects of plan provisions. Se-
lecting one-plan ﬁrms assures that (by and large) the cost diﬀerences ob-
served aren ot confounded by the self-selection of employees into plans.
The analysis is based on annual expenditure, where data for three years
areu sed to calculate rates and treatment costs by plan.
8.1.2 Summary Description
Each person who reports medical spending in a year is assigned to a
predominant diagnosis group. This is the group to which the largest share
of an enrollee’s expenditures can be allocated. There are thirty such groups
listed in table 8.1. These include outpatient and residual (which includes































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eexpenditures not assigned to any of the identiﬁed groups). Persons who
are assigned to the lung cancer group, for example, having incurred sub-
stantial expenditure for the treatment of lung cancer, are likely to have
incurred expenditures related to other diagnosis groups as well.
The diagnosis groups are listed in table 8.1 by the average cost of treat-
ment—over all of the eight plans—given that diagnosis group. The aver-
aget reatment cost ranges from $34,736 for lung cancer to $1,110 for the
outpatient predominant diagnosis group. The average diagnosis rate is
shown in the ﬁrst column of the table. Almost9 2p ercent of enrollees are
in the outpatient group. The diagnosis rate for the other groups is typically
well under 1 in 100 and often as low as 1 in 1,000. Approximately 2 percent
of enrollees are in the residual group. The diagnosis rate times the treat-
ment cost given diagnosis give the average cost per enrollee, shown in the
third column of the table. Finally, the proportion of total expenditures
accounted for by each diagnosis group is shown in the last column. About
48 percent of cost is accounted for by the 92 percent of employees in the
outpatient group and about 18 percenti sa c c o u n t e df o rb yt h ea pproxi-
mately 2 percent who are in the residual category. The remaining 34 per-
cent is accounted for by the 6 percent of persons in the other diagnostic
groups. We will see that diﬀerences across ﬁrms in both diagnosis rates
and treatment cost given diagnosis account for large diﬀerences ina v e rage
expenditure. Indeed, both may contribute to higher or lower costs in the
sameﬁrm,oronemayincreaseandtheotherdecreasecostinthesameﬁrm.
The key elements of cost diﬀerence are the diagnosis rate and treatment
cost given diagnosis. The diagnosis rates in each plan are shown in table
8.2; the treatment costs are shown in table 8.3. Consider substance abuse,
fore xample: The diagnosis rate variesf romalow of 5 in 10,000 enrollees
toah igho f6i n1,000. The treatment cost varies from a high of $17,377
toal ow of $7,117.
Beginning with the data in these two tables (including the raw data that
underlie the means) we want to decompose the diﬀerences in average cost
across plans that range from an overall low of $1,645 to a high of $2,484, a
diﬀerence of more than 50 percent. There are three reasons for cost diﬀer-
ences: (1) diﬀerences in the demographic attributes—age and gender—of
enrollees, (2) diﬀerences in the illnesses that are treated—the diagnosis
rate, and (3) diﬀerences in the cost of treating illnesses. Our goal is to at-
tribute observed cost diﬀerences to these three sources. A particular com-
plication is that treatment cost diﬀerences across plans may diﬀer substan-
tially by diagnosis, and we would like to know which diagnoses account
for diﬀerences in treatment cost. A ﬁrm with low treatment cost for one
diagnosis may have high treatment cost for another diagnosis; thus it is im-
portant to consider the interaction between diagnosis and treatment cost.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.8.2 The Decomposition of Cost Diﬀerences
We begin with the eight plans described above. As explained, the mem-
bers of each plan are divided into thirty predominant diagnosis categories,
deﬁned by the diagnosis group in which the largest share of a member’s
expenditure—in a given year—occurred. The data can be thought of as
arranged in two 30  5m atrices,a sshown in tables 8.2 and 8.3. The ﬁrst
matrix reports the proportion of enrollees in each plan who are in each
of the diagnosis groups. The elements of this matrix are “rates” ki, the
proportion of enrollees in plan i who are in diagnosis group k.T h es e cond
matrix reports the average cost of treating patients in each of the diagnosis
groups. The elements of this matrix are costs dki, the cost of treating per-
sons in plan i who are in diagnosis group k.
We want to know why the costs in one plan diﬀer from the average cost.
That is, wew a n tt od e c o m pose the cost diﬀerences. Consider diagnosis k:
What accounts for the diﬀerence in expenditure for treating patients in this
diagnosis in Plan i,c o m p a r e dt ot h ea v e r a g ee xpenditure for diagnosis k
patients. The diagnosis could be pregnancy, cancer, or outpatient care, for
example. The cost depends on two factors: (1) the proportion of enrollees
treated for diagnosis k (the rate), and (2) the cost of their treatment given
that diagnosis. Both the rate and the cost will depend on the demographic
mix (age and gender) of persons in Plan i as compared to the average mix
across all plans. Suppose that both the rate and the cost are adjusted for
demographic mix, as explained below. Call the adjusted elements  ˜
ki and
d ˜
ki.T h e nthe deviation from the average rate, and the deviation from the
average cost, due to demographic mix, can be denoted by ki  ˜
ki  
and dki  d ˜
ki  dk,r e s p e c t ively.
Table 8.4 illustrates the adjustment for substance abuse. The ﬁrst row
shows the unadjusted diagnosis rate by plan. The next row shows the rate
adjusted for the demographic mix of each plan. While the unadjusted rates
varyf rom5 0t o621 in 10,000, the rates adjusted for demographic mix
rangeo nly from 250 to 278 per 10,000 enrollees. The rate deviations due
to demographic mix are shown in the third row and are quite small com-
paredt othe unadjusted rate diﬀerences. Thus, for the group with sub-
stance abuse as a predominate diagnosis, not much of the rate diﬀerence
can be attributed to diﬀerences in demographic mix across ﬁrms. Unad-
justed treatment costs are shown in the fourth row and the costs adjusted
for demographic mix in the ﬁfth row. The deviation for average treatment
cost that can be attributed to demographic mix ranges from $71.33 to
$574.51, which is very small compared to the unadjusted diﬀerences in
treatment cost across plans.
We canw rite the total deviation of the rate and cost elements of Plan i
from the average across plans as the sum of two parts, one due to demo-
graphic mix and the other due to other factors:



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 
ki ki ki ki k k
ki ki k
ki ki ki ki k k
ki ki k
dd d d dd
dd d
=− () +− () +
=++








Now we can decompose the expenditure on diagnosis k in ﬁrm i (that is,
the proportion of enrollees in diagnosis group k times the treatment cost
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The ﬁrst term in parentheses decomposes the cost diﬀerence—between
ﬁrm i and the average cost—due to demographic mix. The second term in
parentheses decomposes the diﬀerence due to other factors, after control-
ling for demographic diﬀerences. That is, this line indicates how the cost
in ﬁrm i diﬀers from the average assuming the demographic mix in ﬁrm i
to be identical to the average demographic mix. The third term in paren-
theses recognizes the interaction between the deviation due to demo-
graphic mix and the deviation in adjusted costs. (The ﬁrst term in the
third line is the adjusted rate deviation times the cost deviation due to
demographic mix. The second term is the adjusted cost deviation times
the rate deviation due to demographic mix.) The components of the ﬁrst
two terms are easily interpreted. The third term, which in practice is very
small, is less intuitive.
Thed ecomposition in either of the ﬁrst two brackets is illustrated graph-
ically in ﬁgure 8.1. Consider the second term, which decomposes cost
diﬀerences that remain after controlling for demographic mix. The square
deﬁned by heavy lines represents the average cost—across all ﬁrms—of
treating persons in diagnosis group k.T he deviation of the cost in Plan i
from the average over all plans is represented by the three components of
the outer box: (1) the ith plan deviation in the rate of diagnosis k holding
the expenditurea tthe base level, which is represented by the top slice; (2)
the ith plan deviation in treatment cost holding the rate at the base level,
which is represented by the right slice; and (3) the product of the rate
deviation times the expenditure deviation for Plan i, the interaction term,
which is represented by the small square to the northeast. These terms
254 Matthew Eichner, Mark McClellan, and David A. Wiseessentially represent a total derivative describing how the cost in Plan i
diﬀers from the average cost. Both the eﬀect ofd e mographic mix and the
eﬀects of other factors can be decomposed in the same way.
The mean cost inﬁ r mi is obtained by summing over all diagnosis
























































































These terms simply add up over all diagnoses the terms represented in the
ﬁgure for one of the diagnoses. In addition to the BASE component, we
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Consider the demographic adjustment. The BASE is just the average cost
over all plans—in this case, $2,127.33. The rate mix is the deviation from
the average that can be attributed the eﬀect ofd e mographic mix on the
rate at which diagnoses are treated. The cost mix is the deviation that can
be attributed to the eﬀect of demographic mix on treatment cost given
diagnosis. Rate ∗ cost mix is the interaction between the two. This term
will be positive if the rate adjustment and the cost adjustment tend to
be positively correlated. The terms in the second bracket have the same
interpretation, but pertain to diﬀerences in rates and costs that remain
after taking out the deviations from the average that can be attributed to
demographic diﬀerences across ﬁrms.
The decomposition of the diﬀerence between medical expenditures in
Plan i and the average over all plans we call Mi and is given by the equa-
tion above, less the BASE terms.
8.3 Results for the Eight Plans
8.3.1 Diﬀerences across Plans
Thed ecomposition results for the eight plans are explained in some de-
tail here. The presentation is primarily graphical, but we begin with table
8.5, which presents the complete decomposition succinctly. The eight plans
are ordered from left to right by mean expenditure per enrollee, which is
shown in the last row of the table. The average cost over all plans ($2,127)
is shown in the second to last row. The diﬀerence between the plan mean
and the overall average is decomposed into the elements shown in the
rows above.T h ediﬀerence is divided into three main components, which
correspond to the sources identiﬁed in the equation for Mi above: demo-
graphic adjustment, demographic adjusted diﬀerence, and the interaction
between the ﬁrst two. Each of the ﬁrst two main components is decom-
posed into three mix eﬀects: rate, cost, and interaction. The third main
component is composed of only two terms. The sum of the sources of cost



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.diﬀerence is equal to the diﬀerence between the plan cost and the overall
average across all plans. Equivalently, the sum of the sources of cost
diﬀerence plus the overall mean equals the plan mean.
Thed ecomposition is more easily seen graphically and we explain the
details of the decomposition with the aid of several ﬁgures. The ﬁrst bar
fore ach plan in ﬁgure 8.2 shows the diﬀerence between each of the plan
costs and the overall average cost. The range is from $482 to $356, a dif-
ference of $838. This cost can be decomposed into the three main compo-
nents. The ﬁrst is the cost diﬀerence that is accounted forb yd i ﬀerences in
plan member demographic characteristics. The second component is the
remaining cost diﬀerence after adjustment for demographic diﬀerences.
The third is a very small interaction component. Plan 2a, for example, is
disadvantaged, in the sense of having higher costs, by the demographic
mix of its members. If for each demographic group expenditures in Plan
2a were equal to the average expenditure, expenditures in Plan 2a would
be higher than the average by $130 because Plan 2a members are more
highly concentrated (than the average over all plans) in demographic
groups that tend to use more medical care. On the other hand, adjusted
ford e mographic mix, expenditures in Plan 2a are unusually low—$151
below the average. Plan 2b is disadvantaged both by demographic mix and
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Fig. 8.2 Decomposition of total cost
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat databy higher costs adjusting for demographic mix. The third interaction term
is very small and can essentially be ignored.
Both the demographic adjustment and the adjusted expenditure diﬀer-
encesc an be further decomposed into three components. The decomposi-
tion of the demographic adjustment is shown in ﬁgure 8.3. The ﬁrst bar
reproduces the total demographic adjustment from ﬁgure 8.2. The second
bar shows the eﬀect ofd e mographic mix on the rate at which diagnoses
aret reated (holding the treatment cost constant). A bar extending upward
indicates that the demographic mix increases the diagnosis rate in higher-
cost diagnosis groups. (That is, the rate would be higher if the diagnosis
rate for each demographic group in the plan were the same as the overall
average.) The third bar shows the eﬀect ofd e mographic mix on treatment
cost (holding the rate constant). Again, a bar extending upward indicates
that the demographic mix increases the cost of treatment. (That is, the
treatment cost would be higher if the cost of treating each diagnosis for a
given demographic group in the plan were the same as the overall average
treatment cost for that demographic group.) The fourth bar represents the
very small interaction eﬀect between these two components. As might be
anticipated, the second and third bars move in parallel: Groups that are
more likely to be in high-cost diagnosis groups are also more costly to treat
Sources of Cost Diﬀerence in Health Insurance Plans 259
Fig. 8.3 Decomposition of demographic adjustment
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat datagiven that they are in the group. Thus the strong correlation between the
two components.
Perhaps the most important diﬀerences are shown in ﬁgure 8.4, panel
A,w h i ch describes the decomposition of the diﬀerence in cost that remains
after the demographic adjustment. That is, suppose that all rates and treat-
ment costs have been adjusted for demographic mix, and then ask what ac-
counts for the remaining diﬀerence. With reference to the diagram again,
there are three sources of diﬀerence between the expenditure in a plan and
the average expenditure over all plans: (1) the diﬀerence in diagnosis rate,
holding the treatment cost at the average, (2) the diﬀerence in treatment
cost, holding the diagnosis rate at the average, and (3) the interaction of
the ﬁrst two. The ﬁrst bar reproduces the diﬀerence in expenditure ad-
justed for demographic mix. Note that unadjusted average plan expendi-
tures vary by $838 (from $482 to $356) as shown in ﬁgure 8.2. Even
after adjusting for demographic mix diﬀerencesa mong plans, however, the
range is still very large, from $642 in Plan 15 to $163 in Plan 21, a diﬀer-
ence of $805.
The next three bars show how the diﬀerence holding demographic mix
constant is decomposed into the three sources. The second bar shows the
diﬀerence that can be attributed to the diagnosis rate mix. A bar extending
upward, as for plan 2b for example, indicates that the rate mix is concen-
trated in higher cost diagnoses. The diﬀerence attributable to rate mix
ranges from a low of $285 in Plan 25 to a high of $341 in Plan 2b,
diﬀerence of $626. The next bar indicates the diﬀerence that can be attrib-
uted tod i ﬀerences in treatment cost. Again, a bar extending upward indi-
cates that treatment cost, given diagnosis, is higher than the average. After
adjusting for demographic mix, the range in cost that can be attributed to
treatment cost diﬀerences alone is still very large—from a low of $432
in Plan 15 to a high of $375 in Plan 21, a diﬀerence of $807.
The last bar shows the interaction between diagnosis rate deviations
from the average rate and treatment cost deviations from the average. A
bar extending downward indicates a negative correlation between the two.
This component is typically negative, although there are two very small
positive values (Plan 15 and Plan 12). Consider Plan 25, for example. The
diagnosis rate mix favors diagnoses having low average treatment cost.
However, in this ﬁrm treatment costs tend to be higher than the average.
Looking across the plans, the negative interaction component indicates
that lower diagnosis rates are associated with higher treatment costs. The
ﬁrm, on average, treats fewer enrollees for high-cost diagnoses, but treat-
ment cost for those who are treated are higher than the average treat-
ment cost.
Unlike the demographic mix, which operates to change the rate mix
and the cost mix in the same direction, the demographically adjusted rate
and cost mix seem to follow no particular pattern across ﬁrms. (The
260 Matthew Eichner, Mark McClellan, and David A. WiseFig. 8.4 Decomposition of adjusted cost diﬀerence (A) after demographic
adjustment, and (B) after total adjusted cost diﬀerence
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat data
A
Bwithin-ﬁrm interaction between rate and cost tends to be negative, as
emphasized above.) Panel B of ﬁgure 8.4 presents the same data as panel
A, buti nthis ﬁgure the plans are ordered by the total adjusted cost diﬀer-
ence.I ti seasy to see in this ﬁgure that there seems to be no particular rela-
tionshipbetweenthecomponentattributabletotheratemixandtheportion
attributable to the cost mix. While for the three plans with the lowest ad-
justedcostnocomponentispositive(withtheexceptionofthesmallinterac-
tion term for Plan 2a), for the other plans the rate and cost mix components
seemt of o llow no particular pattern. Plans 2a and 2b are in the same ﬁrm
and adjusted costs diﬀer by $461. (The unadjusted cost diﬀerence is $387.)
The diﬀerence is primarily accounted for the rate mix, which accounts for
ad i ﬀerence of $622. The Plan 2a rate mix is concentrated in low-cost
diagnoses and the Plan 2b rate mix is concentrated in high-cost diagnoses.
This diﬀerence attributable to rate mix is partially oﬀset by the cost diﬀer-
ence:C o sts are in fact $159 lower in Plan 2b than in Plan 2a.
Forc ompleteness, the very small diﬀerences that can be attributed to
the interaction between the demographic adjustment and the adjusted cost
diﬀerences is shown in ﬁgure 8.5. The last bar, for example, typically ex-
tends downward. This indicates that for most plans there is a small nega-
tive relationship between the demographic adjustment to treatment cost
foradiagnosis and the adjusted rate deviation for that diagnosis.
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Fig. 8.5 Decomposition of interaction demo adjust and adjusted diﬀerence
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat dataThet abulation below summarizes the results thus far. It shows ﬁrst the
rangei nunadjusted expenditures, then the range in demographic mix ad-
justments, the range in adjusted expenditures, and ﬁnally the range in ad-
justed treatment costs.
Range ind i ﬀerences by source
Source Range ($)
Unadjusted expenditures 838
Demographic mix: Total 649
Demographic adjusted expenditures: Total 772
Rate mix 626
Treatment cost mix 807
Perhaps the most noticeable feature of these results is that the range in
demographic adjusted expenditures accounted for by the treatment cost
mix ($807) is almost as wide as the unadjusted range in expenditures
($838). That is, even though the eﬀects of demographic mix are large, with
the diﬀerence between the lowest and highest adjustments equal to $649,
remaining diﬀerences in treatment cost are still very large. Diﬀerences in
cost due to the diﬀerent mixes of illness that are treated also accounts for
large diﬀerences in cost ($626), once demographic mix is controlled for.
Once the decomposition has been set out in this way, more detailed
comparisons can be made. For example, suppose we want to know for
which diagnoses the treatment cost diﬀerences are the largest. Figure 8.6,
panel A,c o m p a res the diﬀerences between treatment costs by diagnosis in
the highest and lowest treatment cost plans (demographically adjusted).
Plan 21 has the highest treatment cost and Plan 15 the lowest. The impor-
tant feature of this ﬁgure is that in all but two diagnoses—which are or-
dered by average treatment cost—the cost is higher in the high-cost Plan
21 than in the low-cost Plan 2a. The diﬀerences are likely to be related to
the mean cost of treatment. Thus panel B of ﬁgure 8.6 shows the cost dif-
ference normalized by the mean treatment cost (across all plans) for each
diagnosis. Panel C of that ﬁgure shows the diﬀerence between the maxi-
muma nd minimum treatment cost (over all eight plans), divided by the
mean treatment cost. Is seems clear that the diﬀerence normalized in this
wayd oes not depend systematically on the average treatment cost. (This
ﬁnding is closely related to evidence reported below on the proportion of
variation in expenditures accounted for by each diagnosis.)
In contrast, ﬁgure 8.7 shows no evident pattern in the treatment rates in
Plan 21 and Plan 15. Similar decomposition calculations based on plans
from multiplan ﬁrms suggest that the rate as well as the treatment cost
may vary systematically by plan, with the treatment cost negatively related
Sources of Cost Diﬀerence in Health Insurance Plans 263Fig. 8.6 (A) Adjusted cost diﬀerence, (B) adjusted cost diﬀerence versus mean,
and (C) adjusted cost range versus mean
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat data
A
BFig. 8.7 Adjusted rate diﬀerence, two diﬀerent ﬁrms’ plans
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat data
C
Fig. 8.6 (cont.)to the diagnosis rate. This negative correlation may well be due to plan
self-selection eﬀects, with persons more likely to incur high cost.
Figures 8.8 and 8.9 show the cost and rate diﬀerences, respectively, by
diagnosis for the two plans—2a and 2b—that are in the same ﬁrm. Demo-
graphically adjusted costs are $159 higher in Plan 2a than in Plan 2b. It
canb eseen in ﬁgure 8.8 that the cost is greater in all but seven of the
thirty diagnosis groups. On the other hand, the rate mix in Plan 2a is more
concentrated in low-cost diagnoses than it is in Plan 2b. Indeed, the rate
in the three lowest cost diagnoses is higher in Plan 2a, but lower in all but
two of the remaining diagnoses. Thus these data suggest that the diﬀer-
encesi nplan provisions yield higher treatment costs in Plan 2a but fewer
treatments for high-cost diagnoses. On balance, the lower treatment rate
outweighs the higher costs.
8.3.2 Decomposing Total Variation
Thed escription above, summarized in particular in the tabulation on
page 257, decomposes into its component parts the diﬀerence between the
expenditure in a given ﬁrm and the average expenditure across all the
ﬁrms. It is clear, for example, that both the rate of treatment and the treat-
ment cost given treatment, as well as demographic diﬀerences, contribute
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Fig. 8.8 Adjusted cost diﬀerence
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat dataimportantly to diﬀerences in expenditures. Another way to think about
what accounts for the diﬀerence in expenditures across ﬁrms is to decom-
pose the variance in expenditures. Unlike the decomposition described
above, however, there is no mathematically exact way of doing this. How-
ever, we canp rovide an approximate decomposition of variation based on
the extent to which each of these components diﬀers from the overall av-
erage.
Thep rocedure can be explained with reference to ﬁgure 8.1. For each
diagnosis, the diﬀerence between the expenditure in a given ﬁrm and the
average over all ﬁrms can be divided into the three components of the
diﬀerence: rate, treatment cost, and interaction. With reference to the dia-
gram, recall that dk and k are overall cost and rate averages, respectively,
for disease k,a n dthat dki and ki are the ﬁrm-speciﬁc deviations from
these averages. We use the absolute value of these deviations to describe
potentially explainable variation across ﬁrms. First we calculate the sum
of the absolute values of the three ﬁrm-speciﬁc rectangles for all diseases,
which isg i v e nb y
ik
ki k ki k ki ki dd d ∑∑ ∗+ ∗+ ∗ || || | | .    
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Fig. 8.9 Adjusted rate diﬀerence, two plans within one ﬁrm
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat dataTher elative contribution of a particular disease to total variation is quanti-
ﬁed by dividing the terms attributable to disease k by this measure of total
variation, and is given by
i
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Analogously, the contribution of cost variation (versus the contribution of
variation in treatment rates, or the interaction terms) to this measure of


















and similarly for the contribution of variation in treatment rates and the
contribution of the interaction terms.
Figure 8.10 shows the proportion of the variation accounted for by each
of the diagnoses, after controlling for demographic diﬀerences across
ﬁrms. Outpatient treatment and the residual treatments account for the
largest proportions. These diagnosis groups also account for a large frac-
tion of expenditures on average, as shown in ﬁgure 8.11, and it is not sur-
prising that they should also account for a large fraction of the variation
of cost across ﬁrms. Thus ﬁgure 8.12 shows the ratio of the proportion of
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Fig. 8.10 Percentage of variation by diagnosis
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat dataFig. 8.11 Percentage of expenditure by diagnosis
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat data
Fig. 8.12 Percentage variation/percentage expenditure
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat datavariation explained to the proportion of expenditure, for each diagnosis.
Relative to expenditure, outpatient care accounts for the smallest propor-
tion of variation. Normal childbirth accounts for the highest proportion.
Perhaps more informative is the comparison between inpatient and all
outpatient care, shown in ﬁgure 8.13. Although outpatient care accounts
for almost 50 percent of expenditures on average, it accounts for only
about 20 percento ft h ev a r iation in cost across ﬁrms. Inpatient care ac-
counts for about 34 percent of expenditures on average, but almost 59
percent of the variation in expenditures. Thus, one can conclude that inpa-
tientc are, whicht ends to include the most intensive medical treatments,
varies substantially from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. (The residual group accounts for
about 20 percento fe x p e n d i t u r ea n da b o u t2 0p ercent of variation in ex-
penditure across ﬁrms.) With reference to ﬁgure 8.1, ﬁgure 8.14 shows that
the most important component of variation is the diagnosis rate, which
accounts for about 52 percent of variation across ﬁrms. Cost diﬀerences
account for about 40 percent, and the interaction between the two for
about 8 percent.
8.4 Summary and Discussion
To gain a better understanding of the sources of cost diﬀerences in
health care expenditures across ﬁrms, we have developed a method to de-
compose expenditure diﬀerences across ﬁrms into their component parts.
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Fig. 8.13 Percentage of variation from outpatient, residual, and inpatient care
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat dataWhile an important goal is to illustrate the method, the substantive results
also seem striking. We have documented large diﬀerences in health care
spending across the eight ﬁrms included in our analysis. Our decomposi-
tion, of course, does not say why the diﬀerences exist, but it does indicate
which diﬀerences must be explained, if diﬀerences in health care costs are
to be understood. The results show large diﬀerences across plans in both
treatment cost and in the rate of treatment for various diagnoses even after
the demographic mix eﬀects have been removed. Thus the ﬁndings suggest
that diﬀerences in treatment intensity as well as diagnosis mix may be
aﬀected byd i ﬀerences in plan provisions. Both diﬀerences could be attrib-
uted to plan incentives. Recall that this analysis is based on one-plan ﬁrms,
so that selection eﬀects within ﬁrms are not confounded with incentive
eﬀects, as is typically the case when employees are oﬀered a menu of plans
from which to choose. Although these results do not adjust for regional
diﬀerences in health care cost, they are consistent with cost diﬀerences
attributed in part to regional diﬀerences in treatment practice and the
price of health care. We know, however, that diﬀerences in treatment cost
like those shown in ﬁgure 8.6 exist between ﬁrms in the same geographic
locations. Indeed, there is a large diﬀerence between the costs in Plans 2a
and 2b, which are in the same geographic locations. In this case the cost
diﬀerence can be attributed primarily to diﬀerence in diagnosis rate mix.
We have also provided an approximate decomposition in the variation
of expenditures across ﬁrms. Although outpatient care accounts for almost
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Fig. 8.14 Percentage of variation from diagnosis rate, cost diﬀerences, and the
interaction of the two
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on MedStat data50 percent of expenditures on average, it accounts for only about 20 per-
cent of the variation in cost across ﬁrms. Inpatient care accounts for about
34 percent of expenditures on average, but almost 59 percent of the varia-
tion in expenditures. Thus one can conclude that high-cost inpatient treat-
ments vary substantially from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. Understanding the exact
sources of this variation may provide insights into reducing the cost of
intensive treatments. (The residual group accounts for about 20 percent of
expenditure and about 20 percent of variation in expenditure across ﬁrms.)
Them osti mportant component of variation is the diagnosis rate, which
accounts for about 52 percent of variation across ﬁrms. Cost diﬀerences
account for about 40 percent, with the remainder accounted for by the
interaction between the two.
Some of these descriptive ﬁndings on the relationship between demo-
graphic characteristics, disease treatment rates, and expenditures associ-
ated with particular diseases can be translated almost directly into impli-
cationsf or policy and further research. For example, we can quantify the
average eﬀects of each of these factors on private health care spending,
and identify the high-variation groups that account for the bulk of diﬀer-
encesi ne xpenditures across employers. By using these methods with panel
data, we can similarly quantify the main sources of changes in health care
expenditures and the high-variation components of expenditure growth
across ﬁrms. When combined with a breakdown of trends in the major
components of health care cost, the decomposition will permit assessment
of the determinants of future medical cost increases, under the current
system. The ﬁndings can also be used to assess the eﬀects of trends in the
demographic composition of ﬁrm workforces. Finally, we can assess the
eﬀects of changes in insurance coverage, like opening Medicare to persons
aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four. We believe that the method of decomposing
cost diﬀerencesa mong ﬁrms, as well as the method of apportioning varia-
tion,c an now be fruitfully extended to analysis of the much larger number
of plans in our ﬁle of ﬁrm claims data.
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This paper uses data from eight ﬁrms to decompose variation in medical
spending across the ﬁrms. The ﬁrms’ spending per person for medical care
services varies from low to high by a factor of roughly 50 percent, and the
main task of the paper is to understand what could account for such vari-
ation.I np articular, the paper seeks to decompose spending diﬀerences
among the ﬁrms into diﬀerences in the age-sex mix of persons enrolled
(demographics), the incidence of diagnoses, and the cost of a given diag-
nosis. None of the ﬁrms permits choice of health insurance plan, which
should minimize the role of selection in causing between-ﬁrm variation
in spending.
The ﬁndingo fv a r i a t ion in medical care spending, of course, is hardly
unique to this study. Similar variation exists even at the state level. In 1991
the three lowest-spending states, Utah, Idaho, and Mississippi, spent
$1,904, $2,037, and $2,162 per resident respectively, whereas the three
highest-spending states, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York spent
$3,333, $3,298, and $3,255 respectively (Basu 1996; the District of Colum-
bia spent even more: $4,693). As a percentage of the national average of
$2,648, Massachusetts spent 126 percent and Utah 72 percent.
Although no one has examined spending at the county level for the en-
tire population, spending by Medicaree nrollees varies substantially across
counties. After adjusting for factor price and demographic variation across
counties, variation in spending across counties is similar in magnitude to
variation in spending across the eight ﬁrms (ﬁgure 8C.1).1 However, be-
cause prices are set administratively in the Medicare system and because
the values in ﬁgure 8C.1 approximately adjust for the geographic variation
in price, almost all of the across-county variation comes from variation in
the quantity of services delivered.
There is also substantial variation across areas in rates of diagnoses and
procedures. For example, heart disease and cancer rates are known to vary
geographically. Deaths from heart disease per 100,000 in 1995 were 216 in
California and 350 in New York (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998). The
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1. These data are actual payments made by Medicare for health maintenance organization
enrollees, and are 95 percent of spending in traditional Medicare by county, adjusted for
variation in age, sex, institutional status, welfare status, and employment status across count-
ies, averaged over ﬁve years, and adjusted for inﬂation. Seventy percent of the amount is
adjusted for variation in Medicare’s hospital wage index to reﬂect factor price variation. The
rangeo fv ariation unadjusted for factor price variation but adjusted for the other factors
listed above is from $221 (Arthur County, Nebraska) to $767 (Richmond County, New York).cancer death rates in the two states were 162 and 213 respectively; it was
250 in Pennsylvania. Chassin et al. (1986) examined variation in the rates
at whichc ommon procedures were performed in the Medicare population
across ten states or large substate areas (e.g., coastal California, eastern
Massachusetts). Typically the area with the highest rate carried out the
procedure at about four times the rate of the lowest area, with the distribu-
tion of rates across the areas reasonably uniform. Furthermore, there was
no strong correlation across procedures; areas that performed one proce-
dure at high rates did not necessarily perform another procedure at high
rates.
In short, there is enormous variation in both disease and spending geo-
graphically, and one would expect at least as much variation at the ﬁrm
level. The data in Eichner, McClellan, and Wise, therefore, are consistent
withwhatweknowaboutvariationinmedicalspendingfromothersources.
Typically, much of the variation in spending is attributed to diﬀerences
in practice patterns among physicians, which in turn is related to medical
uncertainty (Phelps 1992, 2000). Some variation is explained by plan pro-
visions, but not a great deal. In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
fore xample, which had substantial diﬀerences in mean spending across
plans, the between-plan variation accounted for only 1 percent of the total
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Fig. 8C.1 Standardized Medicare payments, by percentile, urban and rural
counties, 1997
Source: Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (1997, 37)variance in spending across individuals (Newhouse and the Insurance Ex-
periment Group 1993). To the degree that there are coverage diﬀerences
among the plans (e.g., one plan covering eyeglasses and another not), of
course, there would be additional variation.
In decomposing the variation, the authors here show that the variation
in spending across the eight ﬁrms is attributable partly to demographics,
partly to variation in the incidence of diagnoses, and partly to variation in
the costliness of diagnoses. Firms that have substantial positive deviations
in one dimension may or may not have positive deviations in other dimen-
sions, and vice versa. I now turn to some comments.
It is hard to know what to make of the size of the demographic devia-
tions without knowing how well these eight ﬁrms represent the universe of
all ﬁrms. It is not surprising, however, that demographics explain variation
in spending. Firms diﬀer in the age and sex mix of their workforces, and
age and sexp r e d i ct medical spending. Hence, some diﬀerences in spending
across ﬁrms will inevitably be explained by age and sex. One might, there-
fore,a ttempt to focus on the variation in spending after adjustment for age
and sex.
Here one runs into the problem that, although inpatient diagnoses tend
to be coded reliably, outpatient diagnoses do not. Inpatient coding is
thought to be reasonably complete and accurate because Medicare and
somep rivate-payer payment turn on the accuracy of inpatient diagnosis
coding. (The diagnosis codes determine the Medicare diagnosis-related
group and, in turn, payment.) In the case of outpatient diagnoses, however,
payment does not turn on the coding for almost all payers. As a result, the
coding of outpatient diagnoses can be seriously incomplete and/or inac-
curate.
Table8 C.1p r esents some data from Medicareo nthis point. These data
Table 8C.1 Consistency of Part B Diagnosis Coding
Likelihood of a Part B Claim
Diagnosis in 1995 Given a Claim in 1994 (%)
Hypertension 59
Coronary artery disease 53
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 62








Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (1998, 17).
Sources of Cost Diﬀerence in Health Insurance Plans 275show the likelihood of a physician (Part B) claim in 1995 with the diagno-
sisc onditional on there being a 1994 claim with the diagnosis; only those
Medicare beneﬁciaries alive in 1994 and 1995 are included in the sample.
For all eleven diagnoses examined, the likelihood of a claim is only moder-
ately over 50 percent. Because one would have expected virtually all per-
sons with these diagnoses to have made a physician visit in 1995, there
would appear to be three possibilities: The 1994 diagnosis was in error;
the 1995 diagnosis was in error; or the physician failed to write down a
diagnosis in 1995. Because these problems occur upstream of MedStat,
the ﬁrm Eichner, McClellan, and Wise use to collect and standardize the
data, they suggest that some of the variation shown for outpatient diagno-
ses,w hich account for nearly half the spending, could be attributable to
variation in coding practices. Moreover, if there is any non-randomness in
coding errors, some of the variation in mean spending conditional on a
diagnosis could also be noise.
Although employees at the ﬁrms had no choice of insurance plan, there
could nonetheless be some selection eﬀects in the data. The most worri-
some diagnoses are perhaps mental health and substance abuse. Here the
problem could occur if certain occupations or ﬁrms were more likely to
attract individuals with such diagnoses, even independently of coverage
provisions. Generous coverage provisions relative to other ﬁrms in the lo-
call abor market might motivate some job choice and add to the variation.
Other diagnoses may also diﬀer across ﬁrms for noneconomic reasons.
Some occupations or industries may also be associated with certain can-
cers or with trauma, for example. In other words, some of the observed
variation across the ﬁrms could well be epidemiologic as well as economic.
Ap ossibly fruitful alternative decomposition would be into unit price
and the real quantity of services. If this is done, it might prove interesting
to compare the variation in the quantity of services with the variation in
the quantity of Medicare services across the counties of residence of the
workers in these ﬁrms. To the degree that employee use and Medicare use
covary, one would emphasize physician practice patterns as an explanation
of the variation.
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